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Abstract 
Emissions trading systems and carbon taxes are two market-based policy instruments for responding 
to the climate change externality. This article focuses on the relationship between the design of 
these carbon pricing instruments and business cycle fluctuations. In particular, whether and how 
these instruments should respond to business cycles is a topical policy question. To answer it, the 
article brings together the relevant empirical and theoretical results from the academic literature. It 
finds that building responsiveness into the design of carbon pricing instruments can reduce the 
burden of regulation by distributing it more evenly over time. Specifically, relative to a fixed cap 
emissions trading system, this can be achieved by relaxing the cap during economic expansions and 
tightening it during recessions. Similarly, a carbon tax regime in which the tax is higher during 
expansions, and lower during recessions, is likely to improve welfare compared to a cyclically 
unresponsive tax. In practice, a mechanism which renders real-world carbon pricing instruments 
responsive is a challenging task. The article provides an overview of the trade-offs involved by 
focusing on the broad classes of mechanisms explored in the literature. The choice of 
responsiveness-inducing mechanism must crucially consider country characteristics such as the 
properties of fluctuations in the country’s GDP and emissions, any relevant political economy 
concerns and its institutional background.  
  
  
1. Introduction 
The recovery from the economic slowdown following the financial crisis saw a substantial expansion 
of interest in how fluctuations in economic activity – known as business cycles, expansions and 
recessions, or boom and bust cycles – interact with climate change policies. Of particular interest are 
the operation and design of two carbon pricing instruments aimed at reducing emissions: emissions 
trading systems (ETSs) and carbon taxes. An ETS is a quantity instrument in which the government 
sets a cap on aggregate emissions and issues emissions permits equal to the cap, which the 
regulated firms must then surrender to the government against their emissions. Crucially, an ETS 
does not fix the price of a permit; rather it is determined by firms’ trading activities within the 
market for permits. On the other hand, a carbon tax is a price instrument whereby regulated firms 
must pay a fixed price for each unit of carbon emitted, but where the total quantity of the emissions 
is not predetermined. Business cycles can influence the efficacy by which both instruments operate. 
A clear example in the case of ETS is the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the 
world’s largest ETS by some margin. EU ETS observers have suggested that the collapse and 
continuing low level of the carbon price since 2008 is due to a combination of the recession cutting 
demand for permits and the system being unable to respond to changes in economic 
circumstances.1 These factors have in turn undermined the price signal which the system is designed 
to generate.  
This article brings together the key results from empirical and theoretical studies relevant for the 
relationship between business cycles and carbon pricing instruments. Based on these results, it 
argues for responsive carbon pricing instruments which reduce the overall burden of regulation by 
distributing it more evenly over time.a  To this end, the article reviews the practical proposals for 
implementing responsive carbon pricing instruments. For instance, it may be beneficial to condition 
the stringency of carbon pricing policy on observable indicators of the business cycle. These 
instruments are known as intensity targets or indexed regulation.  In a similar vein, hybrid 
instruments aim to combine the desirable features of ETSs and carbon taxes by limiting excessive 
permit price movements. They work by committing the regulators to intervene when certain 
predefined conditions are met. Finally, some have called for the creation of an independent body, 
akin to a central bank, to manage the carbon price. The mandate of such body would be to evaluate 
the appropriateness of the carbon price in light of the broader climate change policy goals and, if 
necessary, adjust the stringency of policy.  
2. Scope and links to related literature 
 
There is a vast literature on taxes and tradable permits aimed at correcting environmental 
externalities. This section does not attempt a comprehensive review of this literature, nor indeed of 
its subset concentrating on climate change. Such reviews are the focus of articles in this journal and 
elsewhere.2, 3 Moreover, a basic understanding of carbon taxes and ETS is assumed throughout. A 
non-technical refresher can be found in Metcalf’s Journal of Economic Perspectives article.4 For the 
more technical reader, Weitzman’s seminal article provides an excellent treatment.5 Finally, this 
article does not review the emerging literature on the ex post evaluation of existing carbon pricing 
instruments where several studies find that carbon pricing has been effective, but that in some 
instances the effects have been small.6-9 
  
In order to analyse the effect of business cycles on carbon pricing instruments in isolation from other 
uncertainties, this article assumes that the long-run target for global climate change policy – e.g. 
limiting average temperature increases to 2°C above pre-industrial levels – and the national 
emissions trajectories consistent with achieving it, are agreed upon and being implemented. 
Moreover, it is assumed that this target is stringent enough so that it has real implications for 
emissions for all fluctuations. In other words, the paper abstracts from scientific uncertainties 
related to climate change, from economic uncertainties (other than those due to business cycles) 
and from political challenges in determining how the burden of the global target will be shared 
among nations. In practice, it is difficult to reduce scientific uncertainties,10 to distinguish persistent, 
yet temporary business cycle deviations from permanent, structural deviations from the norm11 and 
to implement national policies consistent with the global target when free-riding incentives 
abound.12  
The article is agnostic about the debate on the relative merits of carbon taxes versus ETSs to reduce 
emissions. Instrument choice is not directly relevant here, and was recently reviewed by Goulder 
and Schein as well as the references therein.3 In that debate, Weitzman’s original insight regarding 
the marginal costs and benefits of abatement plays a critical role. Specifically, if for a small increase 
in abatement the change in the marginal costs is greater than that in the marginal benefits, then a 
price instrument is preferred. Against this backdrop, a unique feature of carbon as a pollutant is that 
marginal costs depend on the flow of emissions whereas marginal benefits are determined by the 
stock in the atmosphere, having accumulated since the Industrial Revolution.b This stock is vast 
relative to business cycle variations in the flow of emissions, making marginal benefits 
approximately constant and creating a general preference for carbon taxes.13-17   
Why, then, have policymakers in the real world so often chosen to regulate CO2 emissions with 
ETSs? Indeed, the World Bank identifies 35 nations (31 of which are regulated at the supranational 
level) and 13 subnational jurisdictions which are currently taking this approach, with 13 additional 
ETSs at various stages of development.18 This suggests that policymakers’ preferences include 
factors that are not explicit in the analysis of the economic efficiency of the instruments. For 
example, Stavins emphasises the current political unacceptability of carbon taxes in the USA and 
adds that it may be easier to construct a well-designed ETS than a well-designed carbon tax.19 
Hepburn points out that if there are tipping points in the climate system, a quantity instrument 
might be preferred to preclude rapid climate change and associated damages.20 Pezzey and Jotzo 
highlight the political economy considerations of raising and recycling substantial revenues as 
factors that work against its wider adoption in practice.21  
Given the scope of analysis described above, the next section recounts empirical evidence on the 
fluctuations in economic activity and emissions.  
  
  
3. Observed fluctuations in economic activity and emissions 
 
Over long time horizons, aggregate economic activity typically increases. This is largely driven by 
technological progress, capital accumulation and population growth. For example, global real gross 
domestic product (GDP) – a key measure of economic activity – increased about six-fold between 
1960 and the present. If this increase had progressed uniformly over time, it would have entailed a 
constant annual growth rate of 3.4%. However, due to economic fluctuations, annual global GDP 
growth was far from uniform in reality.  
In fact, global GDP growth fluctuated within a wide range, from a 2.1% contraction up to 6.6% 
growth. Focusing on individual countries, the fluctuations in GDP growth rate were even higher. For 
example, the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s turned high growth rates of close to 10% into 
negative values for several countries in the region, with Indonesia and Thailand’s economies 
contracting by more than 10%.  
Economic fluctuations can be analysed at various levels of aggregation and frequency, and using a 
number of indicators. The National Bureau of Economic Research provides a non-technical 
discussion of these choices in the US context.22 One way to study the interplay between carbon 
pricing instruments and economic fluctuations is to use annual real GDP data at the country level to 
identify recessions and booms, defined as years in which real GDP is respectively below or above 
what is considered normal for the country. Although determining the norm for a given year can be a 
technical and controversial question, it is innocuous for the question at hand.  
While all countries are affected by economic fluctuations, they do not all experience them in the 
same way. It would be surprising if China and the UK experienced fluctuations similarly in light of 
their different stages of development, economic structures, institutions, trading partners and so 
forth. The relationship between emissions and economic fluctuations is also likely to differ because 
China and the UK have vastly different energy systems and endowments. Consequently, the same 
instrument for pricing carbon might trigger different outcomes in different countries. 
This paper focuses on three important characteristics for describing fluctuations in GDP and 
emissions. When a country enters a recession, its GDP declines relative to normal times and the 
opposite happens during a boom. The size of economic fluctuations measures how large these 
departures are from the norm. It can be summarised by the volatility of GDP growth rates, or one 
can use more complex times series filters to decompose an observed time series into growth and 
cyclical components, and focus on the volatility of the latter. Regardless of the method, several 
studies focusing on this question have produced robust findings to show that advanced countries 
experience smaller GDP fluctuations.23-27  
How emissions change over the business cycle is captured by the correlation of emissions 
fluctuations with GDP fluctuations. One would expect emissions to be lower than normal in 
recessions and higher in expansions. This expectation is confirmed in a number of studies which 
analyse historical data for advanced and developing countries.28-31 In other words, these studies 
suggest that emissions are procyclical, or positively correlated with GDP over the business cycle.c 
There is also evidence that the strength of the association is greater in advanced countries, so when 
the economy is in a boom, it is more likely that the emissions will be higher than normal compared 
with developing countries.28 
  
The final characteristic is the size of emissions fluctuations, especially relative to the size of GDP 
fluctuations. One can measure it by the volatility of emissions growth rates, or of cyclical 
components of the filtered emissions series. In a study of cross-country historical data on emissions 
fluctuations over business cycles, Doda shows that the size of emissions fluctuations is larger than 
the size of GDP fluctuations.28 These results are consistent with those obtained, using a different 
methodology, by Newell and Pizer for the 19 largest emitters.31 The former study also shows that 
the size of emissions fluctuations declines as countries develop, both in absolute terms and relative 
to GDP. However, emissions always remain cyclically more volatile than GDP. For example, in an 
average advanced country, GDP and emissions may fluctuate within 2% and 4% of their normal 
values, respectively, while in an average developing country the analogous figures are more like 3% 
and 10%. 
A common feature of the aforementioned studies is their focus on short-run GDP and emissions 
fluctuations. This is distinct from these variables’ secular long-term trends. Indeed, both short– and 
long-run dynamics exhibit large uncertainties. These issues are illustrated elsewhere using the US as 
an example.28, 29 It is crucial to keep the distinction in mind. For example, Jakob, Haller and 
Marschinski find that emissions and GDP growth are partially decoupled, in that they are 
uncorrelated in advanced countries.32 However this finding is based on data averaged over five years 
and therefore is only informative about the long-term relationship. Put differently, it is possible that 
while emissions and GDP are positively correlated at business cycle frequencies (procyclical), there 
may be no significant long-term relationship.  
To summarise, GDP fluctuations affect all countries but the size of these fluctuations differ greatly 
across countries. Emissions fluctuations are typically procyclical and more volatile than GDP 
fluctuations. These properties of emissions vary across countries as well. These observations suggest 
that it may be possible to improve the design of carbon pricing policies by explicitly taking business 
cycle fluctuations into account.  
4. Theory of carbon pricing in good times...and bad 
 
Putting a price on carbon is generally considered an effective way to address the climate change 
externality.33 However, it is not obvious whether carbon pricing instruments can work better by 
responding to economic fluctuations. For example, the price of ETS permits will fall during a 
recession due to reduced demand, whereas the scarcity of permits in a boom will increase their 
price. The extent of these price fluctuations is influenced by the ETS design. A well-designed system 
can prevent prices from falling too low during a recession, maintaining the abatement incentive, and 
from overshooting in a boom and excessively constraining firms precisely when they are at their 
most productive. Economic theory can help determine how low is too low, what is excessively high, 
and what governments can do about it.  
In a recent study, Heutel uses a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and 
modifies it to study first– and second-best emissions.29 He finds that in the first-best scenario, the 
social planner increases emissions during expansions and decreases them during recessions. To 
achieve such optimally procyclical emissions, carbon pricing instruments must be responsive, that is, 
adjustable in each period to account for total factor productivity shocks. Specifically, the ETS cap in 
Heutel’s framework is tightened in recessions and relaxed during booms. Alternatively, if a carbon 
  
tax is used, then it is higher in booms and lower in recessions.d Both instruments imply lower 
variability in emissions relative to when there is no policy intervention.  
There have been other DSGE models focusing on the cyclical behaviour of climate change policy. 
Using a more general model, Lintunen and Vilmi also find that the optimal carbon tax, or ETS cap, is 
procyclical.34 Annicchiaricoa and Di Dio show that in a New Keynesian framework with sticky prices, 
the cyclical behaviour of optimal climate change policy is consistent with these findings, but 
quantitatively, the level of prices stickiness exerts a significant influence.35 Fisher and Springborn use 
a DSGE model to evaluate the welfare implications of three fixed and comparable, as opposed to 
optimal, climate change policies: an ETS with a fixed cap, a fixed carbon tax and an ETS with a cap 
that is proportional to output.36 They find that the latter has desirable welfare properties. This result 
is confirmed by the findings of Annicchiaricoa and Di Dio, except when the degree of price rigidity is 
high.e  
Another way to view the procyclicality of carbon pricing policy instruments is through the lens of 
dynamic general equilibrium models of climate change which do not explicitly account for stochastic 
business cycle fluctuations. A classical result in this literature, see for example Golosov et al37 and 
references therein, is that the optimal carbon price increases in the growth rate of the economy. 
Growth is exceptionally high in periods of boom so the carbon price is optimally higher in these 
periods. However, a fixed ETS cap delivers too high a carbon price, and in the case of a fixed carbon 
tax the price is suboptimally low for the boom period. Consequently, an optimally responsive policy 
increases the level of each instrument in booms and decreases them in recessions.  
Allowing firms to raise production – along with emissions – above normal takes advantage of the 
temporarily higher productivity of boom periods; but in order to the meet long-term emissions 
targets, this must be compensated for with lower than normal emissions during recessions when 
productivity is low. The trade-off is feasible because climate change damages are due to the 
accumulated emissions in the atmosphere, rather than the amount emitted each year.   
In theory a government can exploit this trade-off to improve welfare but doing so in practice 
requires timely and accurate information regarding the state of the economy. For example, in 
Heutel’s model perfect knowledge of the economic environment and random productivity shocks 
allows the social planner to construct optimal policy functions whose form and parameters 
synthesize all relevant information.f In other words, with the aid these functions the planner can 
determine the welfare maximizing level of the ETS cap or carbon tax each period conditional on the 
realization of the productivity shock.  
However, even when a real world policymaker has accurate knowledge of the economic 
environment, shocks are imperfectly observable, if at all, in real time. Assuming the policymaker’s 
best information on today’s shock is last period’s realized GDP, Heutel shows numerically that the 
second-best adjustments to the ETS cap or carbon tax are procyclical, linking his work with the 
literature on indexed regulation discussed below. Similarly, using a more general model Lintunen 
and Vilmi speculate that indexing the policy instrument to observables will improve welfare, 
especially if the substitutability between fossil fuels and clean energy sources is low. However, this 
result is not demonstrated rigorously.  
  
As with any quantitative model, the magnitude of implied policy response to business cycles is 
sensitive to the calibrated parameter values. Taking their calibration at face value, a common finding 
of models which analyse optimal carbon pricing policy is that substantial cyclical adjustment to ETS 
caps and carbon taxes is required.29, 34, 35 In spite of this, Lintunen and Vilmi also find that the welfare 
gain of an optimal (cyclically varying) carbon tax relative to a constant tax is small. This likely reflects 
the small variation in marginal damages due to emissions fluctuations. That said, additional research 
is needed on the quantitative exploration of welfare in DSGE models because welfare in these 
models also depend on fluctuations in consumption which varies substantially across countries. 
Recent DSGE models have made substantial contributions to our understanding of cyclically varying 
policy instruments. The literature on indexed regulation and intensity targets, which rely on partial 
equilibrium models, is also relevant.g Such models are used to analyse how the ETS cap can be 
indexed to some observable variable – often real GDP – and have revealed a number of important 
insights. 30, 38-41 First, a higher correlation between the index variable and emissions indicates a 
greater preference for indexation. Second, indexation is also preferred if the volatility of the index 
variable is small relative to the volatility of emissions. Third, it is generally possible to design an 
indexation formula which improves welfare relative to a fixed cap, although this typically makes the 
instrument more complex. These insights suggest that, given the findings in Section 3, indexed ETS 
caps are likely to improve welfare, provided the indexation mechanism properly accounts for 
country characteristics.  
Against this background, Edenhofer and Marschinski cast doubt on the magnitude of the benefits of 
intensity targets, suggesting that they may not warrant the extra cost in terms of added policy 
complexity.42 However, their conclusion can be challenged in a number of ways: First, their 
arguments are based on simple static abatement cost-minimization models. Second, the empirical 
evidence underpinning their conclusion, i.e. their estimates of the variance and correlation 
parameters, are at odds with the evidence reviewed above. Third, the net benefits of intensity 
targets are likely to be greater in a dynamic general equilibrium setting because they provide greater 
room for optimizing decisions on consumption, saving and production. Finally, while unlimited 
banking and borrowing can indeed substitute for an intensity target, intertemporal permit trade is 
not without its problems. 
Carbon pricing instruments can also be made responsive to business cycle fluctuations by mixing 
elements of a carbon tax into an ETS – a possibility first recognized by Roberts and Spence.43 These 
are known as hybrid instruments. They impose a price ceiling and/or a price floor in an otherwise 
standard ETS. When the market price reaches these bounds, the government commits to 
intervention. At price floor, permits are removed from the market which effectively reduces the cap. 
At price ceiling, new permits are introduced, relaxing the cap.  
Adapting Robert and Spence’s original insight to climate change, several recent studies find that 
hybrid instruments can improve welfare relative to a simple quantity instrument.17, 44-46 As in the 
case of formulating indexation mechanisms, determining the price bounds, and the quantity of 
permits to be injected or withdrawn at these bounds, requires careful consideration of the country’s 
circumstances.h 
It is worth noting that an ETS with unlimited intertemporal trade of permits, assuming no capital 
market imperfections, can approximate the outcomes under first-best responsive policies rather 
  
well.47, 48 Through banking and borrowing regulated firms, rather than government, would effectively 
adjust period-by-period constraints to spread the effect of cost shocks over time. However, 
unlimited borrowing by firms can lead to adverse selection. This in turn raises questions of 
appropriate borrowing constraints, intertemporal allocation of permits and the specification of 
trading ratios over time. As a consequence, existing ETSs often feature unlimited banking and 
minimal borrowing provisions. 
The theoretical analysis suggests that responsive carbon pricing instruments have the potential to 
improve upon fixed policies. Despite this, implementing responsiveness faces several challenges. In 
reality, acquiring timely and accurate knowledge of the state of the economy is crucial but costly, if 
not impossible. Moreover, implementation lags can make perfectly formulated policy for today’s 
state inappropriate for tomorrow’s circumstances. The theory assumes there is effectively one 
policymaker, one citizen and one firm, but the fragmented and heterogeneous real world gives rise 
to political economy complications. For example, decision makers in the idealised world are 
oblivious to the differences between a carbon tax and an ETS; they face no re-election constraint; 
and are insensitive to lobbying on how revenues are recycled, or on how (many) free permits are 
allocated to energy-intensive or trade-exposed sectors.49 Finally, the theory may be omitting 
relevant features of the problem: there are no market failures other than the climate change 
externality and no pre-existing distortions in the economy.  
5. Making carbon pricing policy responsive to business cycles 
 
Against this backdrop of empirical and theoretical insights, this section reviews the salient features 
of mechanisms which can render an ETS cap or a carbon tax responsive in practice. The discussion 
abstracts away from individual instruments and speaks, rather, in terms of stringency of carbon 
pricing policy. It is based on the understanding that a constant ETS cap is too stringent, relative to 
first-best, in economic expansions whereas a constant carbon tax is too stringent during recessions. 
Should a government institute a rule for policy stringency? If so how should the government pick the 
parameters of the rule? Alternatively, should the government reconsider the stringency of its policy 
as circumstances change? If so, what changes in economic, political and scientific circumstances 
would merit an adjustment to policy stringency? These questions illustrate the long-running debate 
on rules versus discretion, with their implied trade-offs between predictability and flexibility. A large 
literature going back to Kydland and Prescott’s seminal analysis50 finds that discretion leads to 
dynamically inconsistent policies and suboptimal outcomes.  
The insights from this literature have been applied to climate change policy in general.51-53 In 
particular, they have been used to frame the recent discussion surrounding the reform of the EU 
ETS.54 These studies expose the dynamic inconsistency of climate change policy and evaluate the 
pros and cons of various ways of addressing it. The discussion below views mechanisms which can 
implement responsive carbon pricing policy in practice through the lens of this literature.  
Consider the rule-based determination of carbon pricing policy stringency. The government must 
choose the parameters of an indexation rule which adjusts stringency based on an observable 
indicator of the business cycle, such as recent GDP or value added in the sectors covered by the 
policy. The discussion in sections 3 and 4 suggest the estimation or calibration of these parameters 
for a given policy rule will yield different results across countries. Moreover, the rule must be 
  
shielded from political interference, perhaps by being enshrined in law which is costly to change. 
Finally, indexed price instruments may be more palatable politically because their stringency is 
reduced in recessions, as opposed to the increased stringency of an indexed ETS cap. Put differently, 
political economy aspects of country characteristics are just as crucial for the design and 
implementation of the rule.  
In the case of hybrid instruments, the government must choose an indicator, as well as appropriate 
trigger points for it, to determine when and how large an intervention is appropriate.  Like 
indexation formulas, these aspects will be sensitive to country characteristics. The academic 
literature reviewed above has primarily focused on permit price as the indicator. However, quantity-
based indicators have also received attention recently in the context of the structural reform of the 
EU ETS through the introduction of the Market Stability Reserve.55  
The principal objection to an ETS with a price ceiling, coupled with unlimited permits available at 
that ceiling, is related to its environmental integrity. If the price ceiling is set too low, the hybrid 
instrument imposes no real constraint on firms during a period of economic expansion, potentially 
resulting in suboptimally high emissions. These objections may be addressed by limiting the number 
of permits that become available at the price ceiling, but only by reducing the benefits of the hybrid 
instrument. Fell et al provide an analysis of this and similar trade-offs in hybrid instruments design.44 
Another key issue is whether market participants can manipulate the mechanism to their advantage 
at the expense of society at large, a possibility discussed by Stocking.56 Finally, to be effective, these 
policies must be credible by making it costly for the government to alter them even when there are 
significant short-run incentives to do so. 
In comparing intensity targets to hybrid instruments, Webster et al point to a general preference for 
the latter, provided the probability with which the price ceiling is reached is not too low.57 By 
lowering the level of the price ceiling, the government can directly control this probability which is in 
part determined by the volatility of emissions in a given country. However, this may be exceedingly 
difficult to achieve in an environment where the politics of a carbon tax is not favourable. 
Opponents of a too-low price ceiling will be quick to charge the government with introducing a 
quasi-tax through the back door.  
There is an alternative way to implement responsive policies which is not undermined by dynamic 
inconsistency, at least in principle. The discretion to adjust policy stringency can be delegated to an 
independent body of experts whose mandate closely aligns with the objectives of broader climate 
change policy. Several authors discuss how this might function in reality, drawing an analogy with 
the role of independent central banks in conducting monetary policy.53, 58-60 Such an independent 
institution would be desirable because it retains flexibility without compromising dynamic 
consistency. It also faces several challenges.  
The required political consensus to make this body truly independent is difficult to build. Its 
mandate and membership is no easier to construct than the parameters of indexation and hybrid 
instruments. The periods when the incentives are greatest for the government to deviate from 
dynamically consistent policies are precisely the periods when the accountability of this institution 
would be called into question. Finally, even if this body exercises its discretion as proficiently as 
possible under the relevant information constraints, it will likely take several years before it can 
build a strong track record – an element which proved crucial for good central banking.  
  
6. Conclusion 
 
This article brings together the relevant empirical and theoretical results from the literature to focus 
on whether and how carbon pricing policy instruments should be designed to respond to business 
cycle fluctuations. The central conclusion is that, in principle, responsive policies will improve 
welfare. Such policies may be implemented by raising the cap of an ETS or the carbon tax in 
economic expansions, and lowering them during recessions so that the long-term target of climate 
policy is not compromised. In practice, the informational and institutional requirements of optimally 
responsive policies are onerous. Taking these and other constraints into account, the article provides 
an overview of broad classes of mechanisms which can make real-world carbon pricing policy 
instruments responsive: indexed regulation, hybrid instruments and an independent body whose 
mandate is to ensure the carbon price is consistent with broader climate change policy goals. 
 
No single mechanism emerges as a dominant option for capturing the welfare gains associated with 
responsive carbon pricing instruments. This is not surprising because a core finding in this analysis is 
the central role country characteristics play in formulating effective mechanisms, particularly the 
substantial variations in the properties of business cycle fluctuations in GDP and emissions. 
Economic theory suggests it is precisely the relative volatility and correlation of these variables 
which determine the magnitude of welfare gains and how they can be realized. The institutional 
background can also be critical. It may be futile to introduce a carbon central bank in a country 
where political interference with nominally independent regulatory bodies is rife. More generally, 
political economy considerations must be a part of the calculus. Advocating hybrid instruments in a 
setting where there is political aversion to price instruments is unlikely to bear fruit. Future research 
contributing to a better understanding of the interaction between these country characteristics and 
responsiveness mechanisms – particularly under explicitly specified information, institutional and 
political economy constraints – would therefore be invaluable.  
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 Notes 
                                                          
a
 This argument assumes problems of adverse selection and informational asymmetries restrict the private 
means to distribute the burden of regulation over time, for example through intertemporal permit trade or 
access to perfect capital markets. The absence of unlimited banking and borrowing provisions from existing 
ETSs suggest these problems are severe in practice. 
b
 In the case of a stock pollutant, Weitzman’s original analysis must be extended to a dynamic setting. Then 
additional parameters, including the correlation of cost shocks across time, discount rate, stock decay rate and 
the rate of benefits growth will also play a role. For the climate change externality, Newell and Pizer (2003) 
show that in the empirically relevant range for these parameters, a price instrument is preferred under open-
loop policies. Karp and Zhang (2005) show that the conclusion remains valid for feedback policies.  
c
 In business cycle research, a variable is said to be countercyclical if its fluctuations are negatively correlated 
with GDP fluctuations. If the fluctuations in a variable and GDP are uncorrelated, then the variable is acyclical.  
d
 In principle unlimited banking and borrowing of permits or access to perfect capital markets could achieve a 
similar outcome as responsive carbon pricing instruments. In practice this is not the case for reasons discussed 
below.  
e
 As stated in the paper, the optimal climate policy is procyclical in Annicchiaricoa and Di Dio (2015) for all 
considered levels of price stickiness. Consequently, there must be a responsive policy which improves upon 
both an ETS with a fixed cap and the intensity target. 
f
 All relevant information in this context includes, but is not limited to, parameters of the production 
technology and functions describing the climate-economy interaction; parameters which determine time and 
risk preferences; properties of the distribution of random productivity shocks such as persistence and 
volatility. 
g
 This literature typically studies how the ETS cap can be indexed to GDP, or equivalently, how to set an 
intensity target. Newell and Pizer (2008) also discuss the conditions under which indexing a carbon tax 
improves welfare. 
h
 Note that although these studies evaluate the implications of ‘price’ floor/ceiling/collars in an ETS, there is 
nothing in principle that precludes the extension of the analysis to ‘quantity’ floor/ceiling/collars for a carbon 
tax. 
